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FOREWORD
Since 2006, Mexico has rapidly climbed the list of potential
trouble spots for U.S. policymakers. Public security in that
country has deteriorated dramatically of late. Drug-fueled
violence has caused thousands of deaths, taken a severe
psychological toll on the citizenry, and, in the estimation of
some observers, brought Mexico to the edge of the failed-state
precipice.
This rapidly unraveling situation has hardly gone
unnoticed in Washington. U.S. officials recently unveiled
the so-called “Merida Initiative,” a multiyear counterdrug
program designed to help the Mexican government turn the
tide in its fight against the cartels. As Hal Brands argues in this
monograph, however, the Merida Initiative may not represent
an optimal solution to the current crisis. It focuses largely on
security, enforcement, and interdiction issues, paying less
attention to the deeper problems that abet the drug trade and
its devastating consequences. These problems include official
corruption; U.S. domestic drug consumption; and a host of
economic, social, and political questions. If left unaddressed,
these ancillary issues will likely frustrate even a counterdrug
program as ambitious and well-intended as the Merida
Initiative.
To make U.S. counternarcotics strategy fully effective,
Brands argues, the United States must forge a more creative
and encompassing approach to the drug trade. This strategy
should combine interdiction and enforcement initiatives with
a wide array of social, economic, political, and U.S. domestic
programs, so as to create a broad, interlocking effort that attacks
the drug trade from all sides. Forging such a strategy will not
be easy, Brands warns, but is nonetheless central to addressing
successfully the growing crisis in Mexico and meeting the
broader challenges of counterdrug policy.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
On June 30, 2008, President George W. Bush signed
into law the Merida Initiative, a 3-year, $1.4 billion
counterdrug assistance program for Mexico and
Central America. The bulk of this money is destined
for Mexico, where it will help fund counternarcotics
operations against the powerful cartels that have
recently turned much of that country into a war zone.
Since 2006, Mexico has suffered thousands of drugrelated killings, a dramatic deterioration of public
security, and severe psychological and social trauma;
the Merida Initiative aims to rectify this situation by
giving the Mexican government the tools to take the
offensive in its fight against the drug traffickers. The
program is likely to be extended in some form when
its original mandate expires, and thus presages a longterm U.S. commitment to counternarcotics in Mexico.
The Merida Initiative is representative of the supplyside approach to the narcotics trade that has long
characterized U.S. drug control policy. It emphasizes
interdiction, enforcement, and security measures,
with domestic treatment and prevention programs,
source-country economic development projects, and
other alternative strategies assuming considerably
less importance. This strategy is broadly similar to
the approach used in Plan Colombia, the multi-billion
dollar U.S. counternarcotics and counterinsurgency
commitment to that country, and was recently
reaffirmed in the 2008 U.S. National Drug Control
Strategy.
Unfortunately, this approach to the drug trade
is unlikely to achieve the desired results in Mexico.
In focusing largely on security, enforcement, and
interdiction, the Merida Initiative pays comparatively
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little attention to the deeper structural problems that
fuel the drug trade and drug-related violence. These
problems, ranging from official corruption in Mexico
to large-scale drug consumption in the United States,
have so far frustrated Mexican attempts to rein in the
cartels, and will likely hinder the effectiveness of the
Merida Initiative as well.
For the Merida Initiative to be fully successful, the
United States must therefore forge a more holistic,
better-integrated approach to the drug trade. This
strategy should aim not simply at strengthening the
forces of order in Mexico, but also at addressing the
root issues that the Merida Initiative comparatively
slights. It should partner enforcement and interdiction
programs with a wide range of measures: anticorruption initiatives, social and economic development, institution-building, and efforts to restrict U.S.
domestic demand and illicit arms trafficking into
Mexico. Implementing such a strategy will not be easy,
but it will be central to improving U.S. counternarcotics
policy and ensuring that the Merida Initiative is more
than a mere palliative for the problems associated with
the Mexican drug trade.
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MEXICO’S NARCO-INSURGENCY
AND U.S. COUNTERDRUG POLICY
INTRODUCTION
In April 2006, individuals linked to one of Mexico’s
powerful drug cartels left the severed heads of two
police officers in front of the municipal building in the
southern port city of Acapulco. The two officials were
apparently abducted and killed in retaliation for their
participation in a shootout with drug traffickers several
days earlier. Their bloodied heads were accompanied
by a hand-written note reading, “So that you learn some
respect,” a message meant to make clear that the cartel
would brook no interference from the authorities.1
Such occurrences have become alarmingly common
in Mexico. A remarkably similar episode played out 2
months later in front of the same municipal building,
while drug-related murders have become so common
in Acapulco that the city is now colloquially known
as Narcopulco.2 Such events in Acapulco are merely
part of a broader trend sweeping the country, where
the past several years, especially the period since 2006,
have seen the emergence of a multi-sided war over the
drug trade. Heavily armed cartels and their enforcers
struggle viciously for control of the drug-trafficking
routes running north into the United States, and
have recently turned their fire against a government
desperate to restrain this bloodshed. For now, the
cartels seem to be winning this battle; despite the best
efforts of Presidents Vicente Fox (2000-06) and Felipe
Calderon (2006-present), the drug trade has continued
apace and drug-related violence has reached ever-
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higher levels of intensity. As a result, Mexico has been
beset by thousands of drug-related deaths over the
past 2 years, growth of narcotics-fueled corruption,
drastic deterioration of public security, and marked
erosion of government authority in various parts of the
country. The effects of this violence are not limited to
Mexico; cartel killings have already spilled over into
the United States, and the potential destabilization of
Mexico’s economy and political system presents a host
of dangers to U.S. interests.
On June 30, 2008, George W. Bush signed into law
the U.S. response to this deteriorating situation. The
Merida Initiative (colloquially referred to as “Plan
Merida” or “Plan Mexico”) is a 3-year, $1.4 billion
counternarcotics package destined for Mexico and
Central America, with Mexico to receive the vast
majority of these funds. The central aim of the Merida
Initiative is to use U.S. money, training, and equipment
to strengthen Mexico’s military and law enforcement
agencies, thereby giving them the capacity to take
and hold the initiative in the fight against the cartels.
The initiative likely presages a long-lasting U.S.
commitment to counternarcotics programs in Mexico;
U.S. and Mexican officials have referred to the program
as constituting a “new paradigm” in bilateral security
relations.3
The Merida Initiative may represent a new
paradigm in U.S.-Mexican affairs, but it also symbolizes
an old paradigm in U.S. counternarcotics policy. In its
emphasis on interdiction and enforcement initiatives,
the Merida Initiative is the latest incarnation of a
longstanding, supply-side approach to the drug
trade. This paradigm focuses mainly on strengthening
international interdiction capacities and indigenous
security forces in order to increase the pressure on
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major foreign traffickers, with domestic treatment
and prevention initiatives, source-country economic
development programs, and other alternative strategies
assuming considerably less importance. This strategy
has been manifest most recently in Plan Colombia,
the multi-billion dollar U.S. counternarcotics and
counterinsurgency commitment to that country, and
was reaffirmed in the Bush administration’s 2008
National Drug Control Strategy.
This approach is politically popular, as shown by
the bipartisan support that the Merida Initiative has
thus far received. But is it an effective method of dealing
with the inter-American drug trade, and will it work in
Mexico? Given the present design and characteristics
of the Merida Initiative, the outlook is not auspicious.
This monograph argues that the Merida Initiative—
and, by extension, U.S. counternarcotics strategy as a
whole—suffers from a basic lack of balance. The Merida
Initiative’s emphasis on internal security, enforcement,
and interdiction is understandable given the current
level of chaos and crime in Mexico, and may indeed
help redress certain of the operational deficiencies that
have hampered Mexican police and military responses
to these problems. Yet the initiative pays comparatively
little attention to the deeper-rooted factors underlying
these devastating phenomena: official corruption,
widespread poverty and inequality, weak governance,
high demand for illegal narcotics in the United States,
and the flow of illicit arms across the U.S. border into
Mexico. So far, President Calderon’s failure to resolve
these issues has hindered his aggressive efforts to
rein in the narcotics trade, and in view of the current
thrust of the Merida Initiative, there is little reason to
think that this program is better suited for such a task.
Accordingly, while the initiative will probably produce
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increases in arrests, seizures, and other traditional
markers of success in the fight against illegal narcotics,
it seems unlikely that, over the long term, it will serve
as anything more than a palliative for the problems
associated with the Mexican drug trade.
The evident shortcomings of the Merida Initiative
point to the need for an overhaul of U.S. counterdrug
strategy. The United States must seize the opportunity
presented by the current crisis in Mexico to forge a more
holistic approach to counternarcotics. This strategy
should aim not simply at strengthening the forces
of order in Mexico, but also at addressing the root
issues that the Merida Initiative comparatively slights.
This means partnering enforcement and interdiction
programs with a wide range of measures, carried out
in a sustained and intensive manner and designed to
attack the drug trade from all angles. These measures
should include anti-corruption initiatives, economic
and social development, institution building, and
efforts to restrict U.S. domestic demand and lessen
illicit arms trafficking into Mexico. Implementing such
a strategy will be expensive and politically difficult,
no doubt, but it will also be essential to making U.S.
counternarcotics policy more effective and ensuring
that the Merida Initiative and its successors do not
evince the same shortcomings that have long plagued
America’s “war on drugs.”
MEXICO’S NARCO-INSURGENCY
Over the past several years, and especially
since 2006, Mexico has experienced an accelerating
increase in drug-related violence and a corresponding
deterioration of internal security. As part of what might
be described as a multi-sided narco-insurgency, well-
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financed cartels are doing battle with the government
and one another for control of the drug corridors into
the United States. Employing private paramilitary
forces that use advanced weapons and are renowned
for their brutality, the cartels have caused thousands
of deaths in the last 2 years, in the process significantly
destabilizing internal order in Mexico. Narcoticsdriven corruption is rampant, government control
of large swaths of the country is tenuous at best, and
predictions that Mexico is on the way to becoming
a failed state are frequent. “Mexico is under siege,”
write two experts on gang-related violence, “and the
barbarians are dangerously close to breaching the
castle walls.”4
The wellspring of this chaos is the immensely
lucrative inter-American narcotics trade. Due to U.S.
interdiction successes in the Caribbean, Mexico has
now become the single most important way-station for
cocaine and heroin produced in the Andes, and is itself a
major producer of marijuana and methamphetamines.
The permeability of the U.S.-Mexican border allows
for easy transit into the United States, and Mexico’s
share of the drug trade has grown steadily over the
past 15 years.5 More than 90 percent of the cocaine
and 70 percent of the methamphetamines and heroin
consumed in the United States now either originates
or passes through Mexico.6 The total value of this trade
is perhaps $25 billion annually (though estimates vary
considerably), much of which is smuggled back into
Mexico or laundered through front businesses in the
United States.7 As one writer notes, “Mexican drug
cartels generate more revenue than at least 40 percent
of Fortune 500 companies, and the U.S. government’s
highest estimate of cartel revenue tops that of Merck,
Deere, and Halliburton.”8
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That this commerce has turned so alarmingly
violent of late results from the breakdown of the rules
that once governed the industry. For much of the 20th
century, Mexico’s ruling Institutional Revolutionary
Party (PRI) oversaw a system of “narcocorruption”
that brought a measure of stability to the drug trade.9
The cartels provided bribes and kept violence to a
minimum. In return, the PRI protected the kingpins
and resolved conflicts between them, most notably by
allocating access to the drug corridors (plazas) to the
United States.10 The Mexican state, explains scholar
Luis Astorga, served as a “referee of disputes and an
apparatus that had the capacity to control, contain,
and simultaneously protect these groups.”11 As the
PRI gradually lost power during the 1980s and 1990s,
this system collapsed. The decline of one-party rule left
the Mexican drug trade without a central governing
authority, and comparative stability soon gave way to a
Hobbesian struggle for control of the plazas. According
to Astorga, the cartels were now forced “to resolve
disputes themselves, and drug traffickers don’t do this
by having meetings.”12
The resulting violence has involved at least seven
cartels, with the most intense conflict revolving
around the actions of four cartels split into two rival
alliances. The first group is headed by the Gulf Cartel,
which has its center of operations in Nuevo Laredo,
and also includes the Tijuana Cartel as well as several
smaller organizations. Opposing this loose alliance is
the Federation, a shifting coalition led by the Sinaloa
Cartel. Based primarily in the states of Baja (Lower
California), Sinaloa, Durango, Sonora, and Chihuahua,
the Sinaloa Cartel is led by the notorious Joaquin “El
Chapo” Guzman, and has forged pacts with several
former rivals, the most important of which is the Juarez
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Cartel.13 Since the late 1990s, these competing factions
have done battle across Mexico, contesting each other’s
control of crucial northern border cities like Nuevo
Laredo, Juarez, and Tijuana, strategic southern ports
like Acapulco, and interior transit points between.
The Federation has launched what the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) calls a “violent eradication
campaign against its rivals,” seeking to dislodge them
from strongholds like Nuevo Laredo and Tijuana; the
Gulf and Tijuana cartels have responded with fierce
attacks throughout Federation territory.14
Because these alliances tend to be tenuous and
impermanent, bloodshed occurs not simply between
them, but within them as well. Smaller cartels shift
allegiances frequently, band-wagoning with or
balancing against the dominant coalition. In early
2008, for instance, the Milenio Cartel defected from
the Federation to ally with the Gulf Cartel, touching
off a new round of bloodshed. (These shifts occur so
regularly that even Mexican government agencies
have difficulty determining who is allied with whom
at a given point.) Power struggles within a single cartel
are also common, as the arrest or assassination of a
cartel leader often fosters violent leadership disputes.
As a result, drug-related violence in Mexico occurs on
several different planes, resulting in a multi-dimensional conflict.15
Paramilitary Organizations.
This bloodshed has been all the more intense due
to the rise of heavily armed, well-trained paramilitary
forces as the chief combatants in the struggle for control
of the drug trade. To outmaneuver and outgun their
rivals (and also the authorities), cartel leaders have
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taken to recruiting former military and police officials,
common criminals, and security guards to serve as
foot soldiers in their own private armies. The Sinaloa
Cartel formed an organization known as Los Pelones
out of military deserters and turncoat police officers;
Guzman now employs a similar group, the Fuerzas
Especiales de Arturo (FEDA), composed of former
security officials and gang members from Mexico and
the United States.
The gold standard for the paramilitaries remains
Los Zetas, an organization linked to the Gulf Cartel.
The Zetas initially consisted of 31 deserters from the
Mexican army’s Airborne Special Forces Groups—
elite counternarcotics units—that switched sides in
1997. The organization has since grown considerably,
now consisting of 100-200 men and women, and is
distinguished by its advanced training and proficiency
in violence. As elite commandos, the original Zetas
were experts in “rapid deployment, aerial assaults,
marksmanship, ambushes, intelligence collection,
counter-surveillance techniques, prisoner rescues,
sophisticated communications, and the art of
intimidation,” skills they have put to good use in their
new profession.16 While many later recruits have come
from more pedestrian backgrounds, the Zetas have
compensated by establishing training camps for these
new members and incorporating roughly 30 Kaibiles,
or former counterinsurgency specialists from the
Guatemalan army, into the ranks.17
The Zetas resemble less a street gang than an
efficient, highly evolved criminal organization. The
group is considered by U.S. officials to be “the most
technologically advanced, sophisticated, and violent”
private army in Mexico.18 They have developed
an efficient organizational apparatus that involves
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individuals as diverse as electronic surveillance
experts and information-gathering prostitutes.19 The
Congressional Research Service reports that the Zetas
are now “an increasingly sophisticated, three-tiered
organization, with leaders and middlemen who
coordinate contracts with petty criminals to carry out
street work.”20
Zeta attacks are often marked by their complex,
elaborate plans and execution. The Zetas have used the
cell-phone signatures of their opponents to coordinate
assassinations and kidnappings, and there are reports
that they have penetrated the radio frequencies used
by Mexican law enforcement.21 The group has been
known to use the sort of swarming tactics favored by
the powerful gangs that control the Brazilian favelas,
and in other cases has put its military experience to
use in more subtle ways.22 In 2007, Zetas disguised as
soldiers infiltrated two police stations under the guise
of a routine weapons inspection and murdered seven
government officials.23
In carrying out these attacks, the Zetas and
their competitors employ an astounding amount
of firepower. The AK-47, long the stock tool of the
Mexican drug trade, is now accompanied by an array
of heavy weapons, including MP-5s, AR-15s, P90
submachine guns, grenade launchers, helicopters,
improvised explosive devices, and 50-caliber machine
guns.24 “You’re looking at the same firepower here
on the border that our soldiers are facing in Iraq and
Afghanistan,” says Thomas Mangan of the U.S. Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF).25
“It is incredible, facing these weapons,” agrees Genaro
Garcia Luna, Mexico’s Secretary of Public Security. “It
is truly astonishing, in terms of quantity, in terms of
caliber.”26
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Another calling card of these groups is their
brutality. Aiming to terrify their opponents and cow
the population, organizations like FEDA and the Zetas
use a variety of savage tactics. The Zetas are known to
strangle, decapitate, and immolate their victims, often
after torturing them for hours. Another group linked
to the Gulf Cartel recently advertised its expertise in
such practices by lobbing five severed heads onto the
floor of a crowded nightclub in Uruapan. Decapitated
heads are often found with notes warning of the
consequences of opposing the cartels. “See. Hear. Shut
up. If you want to stay alive,” read one.27
Since 2006, these groups have increasingly turned
their fire on the authorities. The cartels have reacted
viciously to the Calderon government’s anti-drug
campaign, responding to arrests and drug seizures by
launching a sustained, bloody war against those that
seek to disrupt their activities. Ambushes of police
convoys and well-coordinated attacks against isolated
government outposts in the northern part of the country
have become frequent.28 The cartels regularly murder
the officials in charge of designing and prosecuting
government counternarcotics operations, including
police chiefs in Nuevo Laredo and elsewhere and the
head of Mexico’s federal police.29 The anti-government
violence has become so intense in recent months as to
cause speculation that the two warring cartel alliances
may have agreed to a truce so as to focus on fighting
the government. Argues one observer, “We’re seeing a
transition from the gangsterism of traditional hitmen
to paramilitary terrorism with guerrilla tactics.”30
Cartel attacks are thus not meant solely to batter
the police and the military, but also to sow fear and
demonstrate that the cartels—not the government—are
dominant in Mexico. Many drug-related killings are

10

spectacularly violent, aimed at achieving the maximum
psychological impact. In one instance, the Zetas stuffed
four Nuevo Laredo police officers inside barrels of diesel
fuel and burned them to death.31 Decapitations such as
those occurring in Acapulco serve the same purpose.32
Cartel enforcers have begun to publish lists of officials
to be targeted for assassination, post execution videos
on YouTube, and coerce newspapers into providing
graphic coverage of their deeds.33 “They are openly
defying the Mexican state,” says one analyst. “They
are showing that they can kill anybody at any time.”34
Third-Generation Gangs and the Extent
of the Threat.
All told, the effects of this violence have been
devastating. There were more than 5,000 drug-related
murders in Mexico between January 2007 and October
2008, with 3,800 of these deaths occurring in the first
10 months of 2008 alone.35 This bloodshed has become
more wanton as it becomes more common; in September
2008, unknown assailants threw grenades into a crowd
in Morelia during an Independence Day celebration.
Aside from inflicting a mounting toll in lives, the
violence has occasioned something approaching mass
psychological trauma. A palpable sense of fear has
spread across much of the population. Says one woman,
“We are prisoners in our own homes.”36 In some
regions—particularly in areas of Chihuahua, Durango,
and Sinaloa—the cartels have become so powerful as to
render government authority nominal or nonexistent.
One DEA official describes the prevailing situation in
northern Mexico as “somewhere between Al Capone’s
Chicago and an outright war.”37
This breakdown of government authority in certain
areas touches on one of the most troubling long-term
11

implications of the narcotics-fueled insurgency in
Mexico: the possibility that it may lead to what one
expert calls the “decomposition of the State.”38 This
phenomenon, in which government power gives way
amid the violence and terror sown by sophisticated
criminal organizations, has become increasingly
common in Latin America over the past 2 decades.
Several countries have witnessed the rise of what are
known as “third-generation gangs.” Larger, more
complex, and more powerful than street gangs, thirdgeneration gangs use violence and intimidation to
weaken government institutions and corrode the
authority of the state.39 Such groups dominate the
favelas of Rio de Janeiro and the barrios of Central
America, which now constitute “no-go” zones for
law enforcement and government officials. Thirdgeneration gangs have emerged as the chief threat
to internal stability and security in Latin America.40
Their activities have given Latin America the highest
homicide rates in the world, dampened economic
activity, and dramatically lowered popular confidence
in government.41
The Mexican cartels and their paramilitary organizations fit firmly within this trend. Drug-related
violence in Mexico has contributed markedly to what
Vanda Felbab-Brown of the Brookings Institution
calls “the hollowing out of the state.”42 Through their
violence, the cartels have laid bare the limits and
weaknesses of the Mexican authorities, leading to a
dramatic souring of popular views on the competence
and credibility of the central government. If current
trends continue, many observers fear, the government
may lose its status as the ultimate arbiter of internal
order, thereby crippling the Mexican state. “The danger
in Mexico,” argues Tony Payan of the University
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of Texas at El Paso, “is that the drug organizations
become so powerful they can challenge the federal
government.”43
The threat from the cartels does not end at the
border. The deteriorating situation in Mexico could
easily trigger a wave of illegal immigration to the
United States; there were more than five times as many
such migrants in 2007 as there were in 2006.44 Rising
political instability could also imperil the $364 billion in
annual commerce that crosses the U.S.-Mexican border
and more than $84 billion in U.S. direct investment.45
Finally, Mexico’s turmoil has already begun to spill
over into Texas, Arizona, and other southwestern
states. Cartel hit squads have carried out murders
in Phoenix and other U.S. cities,46 and an individual
linked to the Zetas is currently wanted in the killing
of a Dallas police officer.47 Traffickers ran down and
killed a U.S. border patrol agent during a cross-border
trafficking operation in January 2008,48 and enforcer
groups like the Zetas are suspected of mounting
armed incursions across the frontier to protect drug
shipments.49 As former State Department official Ray
Walser observes, “Not since the Mexican Revolution
of 1910-1917 has violence in Mexico presented such a
worrisome challenge to U.S. security.”50
The Government Response: Why So Ineffective?
The Mexican government has hardly been inactive
in seeking to meet the cartels’ challenge. In 2005, Vicente
Fox, Mexico’s first post-PRI president, promised to
wage “the mother of all battles” on the narcotraficantes.51
He purged corrupt police commanders (and in
some cases, entire police forces), targeted high-level
traffickers, and deployed federal troops to the northern
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part of the country. Felipe Calderon, who took office
in late 2006, has been even more aggressive in his
response. “There will be no truce and no quarter to the
enemies of Mexico,” he says, sometimes donning an
army uniform to underline his resolve.52 Calderon has
sent 12,000 federal police officials and 20,000 soldiers
to 12 states in a series of “lightning strikes” aimed at
containing drug-related violence.53
These efforts have not been without effect. Under
Calderon, the government has detained more than
14,000 suspects (including a number of high-profile
targets) and seized large quantities of heroin, cocaine,
marijuana, and methamphetamines. Massive police
and troop deployments have temporarily tamped
down violence in certain areas, and have somewhat
weakened the cartels. Los Pelones have become less
effective, and the Zetas have seen several of their
leaders arrested or killed.54
Unfortunately, the positive effects of the government offensive have been transitory at best. The
recent upsurge in violence indicates that these programs have not brought the cartels to heel. While increased seizures and interdictions have caused increases of up to 20 percent in the street price of cocaine
and heroin, these measures seem to have made little
more than a dent in the overall volume and value of the
drug trade. According to the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO), Calderon’s offensive
“does not appear to have significantly reduced drug
trafficking in Mexico.”55
Why this disappointing outcome? One reason
is that the Mexican government simply does not
possess the enforcement capabilities necessary to
confront the cartels. Coordination between Mexico’s
two federal and more than 1,600 local and state police
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forces is weak and inconsistent, complicating efforts
to mount large-scale operations. The Mexican police
and military lack the manpower to remain in all drug
hot-spots indefinitely, and in many cases, the cartels
simply wait for the troops to depart before resuming
operations. (One DEA agent calls this the “whack-amole” effect.)56 When the cartels do stand and fight, the
results are often little better, as groups like the Zetas
and FEDA are frequently better-armed and bettertrained than the authorities. “They are professionals,”
comments one analyst of the paramilitaries. “The
authorities don’t have the resources to face up to a
phenomenon like this.”57 In such circumstances, it is
hardly surprising that a majority of Mexicans now feel
that the government is losing its war on drugs.58
But Calderon’s difficulties are not just a matter of
firepower and numbers. An ability to blunt the antidrug offensive is also intimately tied to several deeper
issues, ranging from widespread poverty, to the
pervasive deficiencies of Mexican governance, to the
persistent U.S. role in abetting the drug trade and the
violence that attends it.
Of these issues, official corruption looms as perhaps
the most important. Corruption has long been endemic
to Mexico, and among aspiring elites, a government
post is still often seen more as a means of personal
enrichment than as a vehicle for disinterested public
service. This mindset is well-captured in the remarks
of a PRI politician who, upon being elected to serve as
a federal deputy, told the residents of his town—his
nominal political base—to “take a good look at my face
because you are never going to see it again in this flyspecked, chicken-shit little village.”59
The lucrative and brutal nature of the drug trade
has compounded this perennial problem. Honest
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public servants—whether local cops or prominent
politicians—who oppose the drug traffickers risk a
violent, painful death. “Why would anyone want to be
a cop,” asks one Mexican commentator, “when no one
can guarantee their safety, less so their life?”60 Those
who collaborate with the cartels, on the other hand,
are in line for massive payoffs—up to $450,000 per
month for high-ranking officials, according to recent
reports.61
The cartels have used this time-tested formula of
plata o plomo (“money or lead”) to co-opt large segments
of the Mexican government. Local police officers have
reportedly kidnapped the Zetas’ competitors and
delivered them to that paramilitary organization to be
tortured and killed.62 More commonly, the local police
provide the cartels with early warning of impending
government operations. “Everyone in the world knows
we’re coming,” one federal police official complains.63
The scope of the corruption is difficult to overstate.
In several instances, local police forces have become
so thoroughly infested with informers that the federal
government has been forced to disband them entirely.
This same problem applies to the federal police; within
the Federal Investigative Agency (AFI), an organization
that was itself created to replace Mexico’s hopelessly
corrupt Federal Judicial Police, 2,500 of 7,000 agents
were being investigated for crimes as of late 2005.64
Since July 2008, Mexican intelligence agencies have
warned that the cartels have secured the cooperation
of members of the national legislature, officials at
the highest levels of the attorney general’s office,
and perhaps even the U.S. embassy.65 The traffickers,
warns Guillermo Valdes, Mexico’s intelligence chief,
are “trying to take over the power of the state.”66 Given
this level of corruption, it is not difficult to understand
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why Calderon’s programs have not produced the
desired results.
The armed forces are generally thought to be far
more honest and trustworthy than the police, which
is one reason why Calderon has relied so heavily on
the military since taking office. Even this institution,
however, is highly vulnerable to the predations of the
cartels. Low pay and difficult working conditions led
to an astounding 100,000 desertions between 2000 and
2006, and nearly 50,000 more since Calderon’s ascension
to the Presidency. The Zetas and other paramilitary
organizations tempt soldiers to switch sides by offering
salaries of up to $3,000 per week (in comparison to
the $1,100 per month earned by most members of the
armed forces).67 Banners hung by the Zetas promise “a
good salary, food, and medical care for your families,”
as well as “loans and life insurance.”68 The undeniable
allure of these offers has led many Mexican officials
to fear that militarizing the drug conflict will simply
lead to greater corruption within the armed forces,
weakening the one relatively reliable pillar of public
order in the country.69
Calderon’s reliance on the military has proved
problematic in other respects as well. The Mexican
army has a sorry history of human rights abuses,
symbolized by the Tlatelolco massacre of 1968. The
armed forces’ record has improved in recent decades,
but violations have increased since the military
became the essential implement of Calderon’s strategy.
According to one estimate, there have been more than
600 human rights violations since late 2006.70 These
abuses allegedly include extrajudicial executions,
illegal detentions, and torture. Soldiers are accused of
stealing from residents during drug-related searches,
and of sexually assaulting 14 women in the state of
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Coahuila in 2006.71 These practices, troubling in their
own right, also come at a cost in terms of weakening
the effectiveness of government counternarcotics
programs. Human rights abuses destroy trust between
the armed forces and the public, making it less likely
that citizens will cooperate in the fight against the
drug traffickers. Such a backlash has already occurred
in several locations. Only 18 percent of residents in
Ciudad Juarez approve of the army’s presence in that
city, and the border town of Ojinaga recently witnessed
public protests against military brutality.72 One Nuevo
Laredo resident concisely expresses the hostility bred
by military and police excesses: “I trust the Zetas more
than the thieving police and soldiers.”73
The structural and institutional weaknesses
dramatized by police and military malfeasance
reach far beyond these organizations, extending into
numerous realms of Mexican governance. The judiciary
is particularly ill-suited to participate in a vigorous
attack on drug-related crime. Mexico’s legal system has
no specific anti-gang laws that could be used to target
the cartels, and the system as a whole is no less corrupt
than the law enforcement community.74 Most Mexican
courts operate according to arcane, colonial-era rules,
and the system is so weak that only 1-2 percent of
all crimes are punished.75 This remarkably low rate
of conviction serves as a virtual guarantee that most
criminals will escape punishment, thus constituting an
immense deterrent to citizen cooperation with ongoing
investigations.
The list of institutional inadequacies goes on.
The Mexican financial system, for instance, is largely
opaque to government oversight, and the fact that the
government cannot compel the banks to report large
deposits makes investigating money laundering and
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corruption all the more difficult.76 Across these and
other examples, one thus encounters the same theme:
In their current state, Mexico’s political and government institutions are simply not strong enough to support a vigorous counterdrug strategy.
An equally entrenched impediment to such a
program is the poverty that afflicts much of Mexican
society. Despite relatively strong macroeconomic
growth over the past 15 years, roughly 40 percent
of Mexico’s population lives in poverty, with 18
percent living in extreme poverty. Moreover, because
Mexico’s macroeconomic successes occurred under
a model that emphasized cutting social programs,
deregulating wages, and allowing prices to rise freely,
the government has been slow to deploy meaningful
initiatives to ameliorate the adverse effects of this
deprivation on the standard of living.77
The cartels thrive on the resentment that often
results. While the narcotraficantes use violence to silence
those who oppose them, they also use the proceeds from
the drug trade to cultivate a loyal following among the
poor and disaffected. The Gulf Cartel donates food,
bicycles, clothing, and toys to Nuevo Laredo residents,
and drug kingpins throw festivals for the residents of
their strongholds.78 In many cases, these overtures find
a receptive audience. Guzman, the leader of the Sinaloa
Cartel, is the subject of admiring narcorridos, or folk
songs, that tout his generosity and his ability to elude
the authorities.79 In the same vein, the combination of
desperate poverty and cartel largesse provides a steady
stream of recruits for these organizations. Young boys
proclaim, “I want to be a Zeta,” and recipients of the
group’s benevolence have said, “We are all Zetas.”80
As Adolfo Franco of the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) notes, “The poverty, lack
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of opportunity, and feelings of hopelessness that
characterize many lives in Latin America are often no
match for the cash flow, livelihood, and social cohesion
offered by many gangs.”81
Finally, efforts to rein in the drug trade have
foundered on two hugely important U.S. contributions
to this industry: demand and guns. With respect to
demand, American buyers continually provide a
lucrative outlet for drugs smuggled through Mexico,
and the billions of dollars in annual profits shipped
back across the border provide the grease that lubricates
the narcotics trade. “In significant measure,” one U.S.
official acknowledges, the perpetuation of drug-related
problems in Mexico “grows out of violent people
taking advantage of the continuing strong demand in
the United States.”82
Similarly, the United States acts as an inexhaustible
arsenal for the cartels. While Mexico has very strict gun
laws, the United States does not, and the vast majority
of weaponry (90-95 percent) used by the traffickers
originates north of the border. Cartel operatives and
middlemen acquire these arms through gun shows,
pawn shops, and dealers in the United States, or
by stealing them from U.S. military facilities. The
weapons are then taken across the border in ones and
twos, forming what Mexican officials call “the iron
river.”83 Though, as one ATF official notes, there is
“no real way to put a metric” on the number of guns
taken into Mexico, some observers estimate as high as
several hundred per day, and there may be up to 40
million illicit weapons in Mexico.84 Neither Mexico nor
the United States has yet fashioned a solution to this
problem; this failure ensures that U.S. guns continue to
play an integral role in Mexican violence.
In sum, the apparent intractability of the drug trade
and drug-related violence in Mexico does not testify
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simply to the paramilitary strengths of the cartels and
the operational deficiencies of the police and military.
It is also inextricably linked to the broader context
of Mexican politics and society, that is, the glaring
institutional failures of Mexican governance and the
U.S. role in perpetuating the narcotics industry. In
short, Mexico’s problems are exceedingly complex and
deep-seated; any real solution to these problems will
have to be no less encompassing.
THE MERIDA INITIATIVE: CHARACTERISTICS,
AIMS, AND PROSPECTS
The Merida Initiative, signed into law by President
George W. Bush on June 30, 2008, represents the U.S
response to this situation. Named for the Mexican city
in which it was agreed upon at an October 2007 summit
between Presidents Bush and Calderon, the initiative
is a 3-year, $1.4 billion counternarcotics package
destined for Mexico and Central America, with the
former country set to receive the vast majority of these
funds ($400 million of the $465 million to be disbursed
in the first year, and similar proportions thereafter).
U.S. counternarcotics aid to Mexico had previously
hovered around $55-60 million annually in the 7 years
since 2000; the Merida Initiative thus represents a
roughly sevenfold expansion of this assistance. For
its part, the Calderon government has committed $7
billion in counternarcotics funding over the next 3
years.85 Officials on both sides of the border have said
that they envision the Merida Initiative as the first step
in a long-term partnership between Washington and
Mexico City.86
The essential thrust of the Merida Initiative is
to better enable Mexican authorities to contain and
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roll back the violence that has roiled that country of
late. It is designed to complement Calderon’s recent
offensive, which U.S. officials have characterized in
highly laudatory terms. Calderon “has shown great
leadership and great strength of character,” Bush said
in 2007, “which gives me good confidence that the plan
we’ll develop will be effective.”87 U.S. assistance will
help “increase the operational capabilities of Mexican
agencies and institutions,” explains a State Department
official, thereby allowing them “to break the power
and impunity of drug and criminal organizations that
threaten the health and public safety of their citizens
and the stability and security of the region.”88
The funding scheme for the Merida Initiative
reflects this hope. Over the next 3 years, the United
States will provide equipment and training to
Mexican law enforcement (which will receive 59
percent of these resources) and the armed forces (41
percent). This aid is to be disbursed in three clusters.
The first is Counternarcotics, Counterterrorism, and
Border Security; the second, Public Security and Law
Enforcement; the third, Institution Building and the
Rule of Law.89
By far the largest chunk of funding (about $327
million of the $400 million allotted for the first year,
or nearly 82 percent) is devoted to the first and second
clusters, which are very similar in their enforcementfirst approach to the drug problem. Roughly 60
percent of this money (slightly more than $200 million)
will pay for eight transport helicopters, designed to
facilitate the rapid deployment of Mexican troops,
and two surveillance aircraft to give the government
greater awareness of cartel activities. The remainder of
these funds will be used to provide law enforcement
agencies with tools to aid detection and interdiction:
ion scanners, Gamma- and X-ray inspection equipment,
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and training for the drug-sniffing dogs of Mexican
police and customs; the modernization of computer
and information systems used by several agencies;
and secure communications equipment to allow more
efficient exchange of information and intelligence.
These programs will substantially increase the antidrug capabilities of the Mexican authorities, U.S.
officials believe, and when combined with Calderon’s
recent decision to increase military spending and
nearly double the size of the federal police, should tilt
the balance in favor of the government.
The remainder of first-year funding (about $73.5
million, or around 18 percent) will go to the third
cluster, Institution Building and the Rule of Law. This
money will be directed toward addressing certain of
the institutional failures that have so far obstructed
more effective government action. It will fund
prison and judicial reform, training in how to handle
evidence, assistance in vetting new police recruits and
commanders, and a limited expansion of Mexican drug
treatment and prevention programs. Examples of aid
to be provided under this cluster include polygraph
technology that can be used to screen police officials
and assistance in improving witness protection capabilities.90
As the allocation of more than 81 percent of firstyear funds to clusters one and two indicates, the central
priorities of the Merida Initiative are interdiction and
enforcement, with institution-building, anti-corruption,
social projects, and economic programs receiving
considerably less (if any) emphasis. Various observers
in the United States and Mexico have criticized this
apparent imbalance, but on the whole there is strong
official support for such an approach.91 President
Calderon has called for the Merida Initiative to be
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extended throughout Latin America. Within the U.S.
Government, backing for the program is bipartisan.92
Prominent Democrats such as Bill Richardson,
Christopher Dodd, and Patrick Leahy support the
measure, and executive branch officials argue that the
program’s stress on interdiction and enforcement is
essential to a successful showdown with the cartels.93
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said: “I see no
other way than to be very tough on organized crime,
to be capable of dealing with these very violent people
who are trying to terrorize the population, who are
trying to carry out their criminal activities. I see no
other way.”94 Scott Burns, the second-ranking U.S. antidrug official, offered a similar assessment, predicting
that the Merida Initiative would “build the capacity of
our friends to permanently shut the door on the largest
inflow of illegal drugs into the United States.”95
Evaluating the Supply-Side Paradigm.
The Merida Initiative was hardly fashioned
from whole cloth. Aside from building on President
Calderon’s anti-drug offensive, it also represents
the latest incarnation of the dominant paradigm in
U.S. counternarcotics policy. Over the past several
decades and especially since the 1980s, counterdrug
initiatives have steadily taken on greater importance
in U.S. diplomacy. With hundreds of tons of cocaine,
heroin, and other drugs entering the United States
annually, drug-related upheaval afflicting U.S. allies
in Latin America, and proceeds from this illicit trade
benefiting terrorist organizations such as al-Qai’da
and the Taliban, Washington has taken a variety of
steps to impede international drug smuggling. Coca
and poppy eradication programs in the Andes and
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Afghanistan, an Air Bridge Denial initiative meant
to disrupt narcotics shipments from South America,
projects aimed at eroding the financial bases of the
drug trade, and numerous other initiatives all fit within
this context. The amount of money devoted to such
endeavors has increased greatly over the past several
years, rising from roughly $3 billion in FY 2002 to $5.4
billion for FY 2009.96
The dominant feature of U.S. counternarcotics
policy is, and long has been, a supply-side approach.
This paradigm, reaffirmed in the provisions of the
Merida Initiative, was also recently restated in the Bush
administration’s 2008 National Drug Control Strategy.
This document assigns the greatest importance to
disrupting the operations of major foreign cartels
rather than restricting domestic demand, promoting
social and economic development in source countries,
or pursuing alternative strategies for combating the
drug trade. The five goals of the strategy are: "(1) reduce
the flow of drugs into the United States; (2) disrupt
and dismantle major drug trafficking organizations;
(3) focus on the nexus between the drug trade and
other potential transnational threats to the United
States, including terrorism; (4) deny drug traffickers,
narcoterrorists, and their criminal associates their
illicit profits and money laundering activities; and (5)
assist foreign countries threatened by illegal drugs in
strengthening their governance and law enforcement
institutions." Funding for counterdrug programs
reflects these priorities, as the Bush administration
increased the proportion of the narcotics control
budget devoted to interdiction and capacity-building
for foreign law enforcement and military agencies,
reduced the percentage of funds spent on domestic
demand restriction, and resisted congressional efforts
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to place greater stress on promoting alternative
development programs in source countries.97
How effective is this paradigm? There is no
shortage of debate. U.S. officials aver that American
counternarcotics programs have helped combat drugrelated violence in South America and elsewhere, and
argue that these initiatives reduce the flow of illegal
drugs into the United States. Critics dispute these
claims, contending that the current counterdrug model
is politically popular but fundamentally misguided.
One way of assessing these arguments, and of
evaluating the efficacy of the current paradigm, is to
examine the emblematic example of that strategy: Plan
Colombia.
Case Study: Plan Colombia.
Between 2000 and the announcement of the Merida
Initiative in late 2007, Plan Colombia dominated U.S.
counterdrug policy. During this period, the Clinton
and Bush administrations poured more than $7 billion
in foreign and military aid into Colombia in hopes
of quelling a drug-fueled insurgency and staunching
the flow of cocaine and heroin to the United States.
U.S. contractors, civilian officials, and uniformed
military were (and continue to be) deeply involved in
counterinsurgency and counternarcotics missions in
Colombia, leading observers to refer to Plan Colombia
as America’s “number three war.”98
Plan Colombia originated in response to a
dangerous synergy between criminal activity and
political violence. By the late 1990s, the Colombian
drug trade had become a major national security issue
for both Colombia and the United States. Colombian
exports accounted for nine-tenths of the cocaine

26

entering the United States, and contributed heavily to
the perhaps 20,000 drug-related deaths that occurred
in the United States per year.99 Within Colombia, the
drug trade was fueling massive corruption that reached
as high as the office of the president, driving intense
internal violence (around 30,000 murders per year, a
sixfold increase from 2 decades prior), and feeding the
ambitions of a powerful Marxist insurgency.100 The
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
used the approximately $380 million it garnered from
the drug trade each year to acquire advanced weapons
and entice new recruits. By 2000, the FARC boasted
around 20,000 combatants, was able to overwhelm and
annihilate isolated army garrisons, had Bogota nearly
cut off from the rest of the country, and controlled
roughly 40 percent of Colombian territory.101 The
group also staged hundreds of attacks on U.S. interests
in Colombia; according to one count, the FARC was
responsible for 55 percent of terrorist attacks against
American targets in 2001.102
Plan Colombia represented a joint U.S.-Colombian
response to these interlocking threats. U.S. aid would
allow a besieged government to take strong action
against the FARC and hundreds of Colombian cartels,
as the thinking went, thereby restricting drug exports
and restoring internal order. “The ultimate test of
success,” said DEA administrator Donnie Marshall,
“will come when we bring to justice the drug lords
who control their vast empires of crime which bring
misery to so many nations.”103 Of the roughly $7 billion
in aid granted under the initiative, nearly 80 percent
went to facilitating interdiction and strengthening
Colombia’s military and National Police, with 10-20
percent devoted to economic and social programs
meant to provide alternative sources of income for
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poor farmers and thus undercut the economic basis of
the drug trade.104
Plan Colombia has been touted by the Bush
administration as a striking success, and damned by
its critics as an utter failure. In reality, its results were
ambiguous, demonstrating both the strengths and
weaknesses of the current counternarcotics paradigm.
With respect to internal security and interdiction,
Plan Colombia has produced clear-cut gains. Since
2000, U.S. assistance has had pronounced benefits in
the fight against the FARC. The training of three elite
counternarcotics battalions (totaling around 3000
soldiers) and 30 Ranger-style strike teams has roughly
doubled the number of elite troops that the Colombian
army can put into the field, while the provision of more
than 70 Blackhawk and Huey II helicopters has greatly
increased the mobility and combat effectiveness of
these forces. U.S. intelligence support has been similarly
beneficial, allowing the Colombian military to target
high-level FARC commanders and aiding in the bold
rescue of 15 high-profile hostages in July 2008.105
Combined with the assertive counterinsurgency
program of President Alvaro Uribe, this aid has
helped deal the FARC a series of staggering blows. The
insurgent leadership has been decimated by targeted
strikes and the deaths of top commanders. Desertions,
captures, and overall guerrilla casualties have risen
dramatically, severely reducing the guerrillas’ numerical strength.106 Colombian forces have largely
cleared the FARC from the departments surrounding
Bogota and substantially weakened the guerrillas
even in traditional redoubts like Putumayo, Caqueta,
and the slums of Medellin.107 The FARC retains a hard
core of some 8,000-10,000 fighters and receives arms
and funding from Venezuela, but its overall military
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effectiveness has declined sharply, and the survival of
democratic government in Colombia is no longer in
imminent peril.108
The interdiction component of Plan Colombia
has (numerically, at least) produced similarly strong
advances. The delivery of ground radar systems,
forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR) for Colombian
intelligence aircraft, patrol boats for riverine
interdiction, and other equipment and training have
greatly increased Colombian interdiction capabilities.109 The number of cocaine laboratories destroyed
rose from 241 in 1999 to nearly 2,200 in 2006, dozens of
drug-carrying aircraft have been captured or destroyed, and arrests and extraditions are up.110 Additionally,
as part of a program that is complementary to but
not explicitly a part of Plan Colombia, cooperation
among U.S., Colombian, and international assets has
allowed the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) of
U.S. Southern Command to make major strides in
disrupting narcotics shipments through the Caribbean.
The number of seizures in the transit zone (the area
between Colombia and the United States) has increased
from 90 to 260 metric tons per year, with the proportion
of shipments seized rising as well.111
These are impressive statistics, but in many ways
they conceal the less successful reality of Plan Colombia.
With respect to an overarching goal of the program—
significantly reducing the quantities of cocaine and
heroin delivered into the United States—the picture
is one of little progress. Between 2000 and 2004, street
prices for cocaine actually decreased, indicating a
steady if not expanding supply. Prices have increased
somewhat since 2005, but on the whole supply is still
more than adequate to meet the continuing domestic
demand for the drug. The Justice Department’s
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National Drug Intelligence Center acknowledges that
“there have been no sustained cocaine shortages or
indications of stretched supplies in domestic markets,”
and shipments to the United States still overwhelmingly
originate in Colombia.112
The reason for this unsatisfying outcome is that
Plan Colombia—and the counternarcotics paradigm
it represents—has suffered from a fundamental
lack of balance. The United States has failed to join
the security and interdiction components of Plan
Colombia with sufficiently bold efforts to reduce U.S.
domestic demand or alter the economic calculus that
drives many Colombians to participate in the drug
trade. Accordingly, seized shipments are quickly
replaced, coca still dominates the rural economy, and
the Colombian-American drug trade continues to
flourish.
Within the United States, the chief marker of this
imbalance is that Plan Colombia was not accompanied
by a parallel push to restrict domestic cocaine and
heroin consumption. In fact, the trend has been just the
opposite, with the percentage of the U.S. drug control
budget devoted to treatment and prevention declining
from 46 percent to 35 percent between FY 2002 and
FY 2007.113 U.S. domestic demand for cocaine and
other drugs remains strong, and it appears that this
continuing demand has led Colombian traffickers to
compensate for the much-touted rise in seizures over
the past several years by simply increasing the quantity
of narcotics shipped.114
Within Colombia, the chief weakness of U.S.
policy has been its failure to reduce the economic
incentives that push poor farmers to provide a steady
supply of coca to the groups that refine and ship it.
As of 2006, Colombian farmers could earn 4-12 times

30

more by cultivating coca than by participating in
the licit economy, roughly the same ratio as before
Plan Colombia.115 “There is nothing as economically
profitable as coca,” concedes one U.S. official.116
Plan Colombia did include programs meant to
redress this problem. USAID and its Colombian
counterparts ran financial and technical assistance
programs that offered cows, cash, and tools to farmers
who signed pledges to abandon coca cultivation.
These agencies also sponsored the construction of
food-processing plants, concrete factories, and other
industrial facilities designed to provide employment
alternatives and promote economic growth in the
countryside.117
Given the pronounced slant of Plan Colombia
funding toward military and police programs,
however, these projects never received the necessary
emphasis. From 2000 to 2005, for instance, U.S. agencies
spent $1.2 billion on aerial spraying programs that
eradicated hundreds of thousands of acres of coca, but
only $213 million on the development programs meant
to lock in these gains by giving the affected farmers
another source of income.118 As a result, economic
development projects have foundered. In 2006, USAID
withdrew from Caqueta in part because of an inability
to sustain alternative development programs, and coca
cultivation in the area has surged since.119 Guaviare, the
second-most sprayed region in Colombia, received just
$500,000 in development assistance between 2000 and
2004, resulting in similar problems.120 In Putumayo,
aerial spraying was devoted to roughly 400,000 acres
of farmland, but, reports the Center for International
Policy’s Adam Isaacson, nonmilitary aid was “slower
to arrive, haphazardly planned, and . . . largely failed
to improve lives and livelihoods.” Farmers regularly
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complain of having signed coca eradication pacts but
never receiving the cows, tools, or money promised in
return. Accordingly, coca eradication programs brought
only temporary improvement, with cultivation having
actually risen since 2003.121 United Nations reports
indicate that at least 70 percent of the land sprayed for
eradication purposes was later reconverted to coca,
and the overall acreage under cultivation actually
increased by 36 percent between 2000 and 2004.122
With the economic incentives for cultivation having
stagnated, the Colombian drug trade has shown no
sign of abating.
Indeed, the void left by the weakening of the FARC
and certain of the cartels has simply been filled by new
actors. During the late 1990s, Colombian commanders
forged an alliance of convenience with an often-brutal
paramilitary group known as the United Self-Defense
Forces of Colombia (AUC) based on a common
hostility to the FARC.123 The AUC played no small role
in the defeats subsequently inflicted on the FARC, but
given the persistent profitability of the drug trade, the
organization exploited these victories by insinuating
itself into the narcotics industry. According to one
estimate, former members of the AUC (which was
technically demobilized in 2003, though many observers
doubt the authenticity of the demobilization) are now
responsible for 40 percent of cocaine production in
Colombia.124 The drug trade has not been defeated, but
simply made subject to new masters.
Overall, Plan Colombia thus rates as only a very
qualified success. Its security accomplishments are
undeniable, as are the upticks in seizures, arrests,
and extraditions. But U.S. policy during this period
has consistently failed to integrate these programs
into a comprehensive counternarcotics strategy that
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fully exploits alternative development programs and
domestic prevention and treatment initiatives. While
Plan Colombia has therefore helped alleviate certain
adverse effects of the drug trade within Colombia, it
has done little to address the deeper factors that drive
that commerce. If Plan Colombia can fairly be said to
represent the current U.S. counternarcotics paradigm,
then that paradigm remains sadly incomplete.
The Merida Initiative: Prospects for Success.
Will the Merida Initiative be more successful than
Plan Colombia, or will it display the same lack of
balance—and therefore produce the same ambiguous
outcome—of that earlier program? In answering this
question, we should stress that the Merida Initiative
is not a carbon copy of Plan Colombia, any more than
the situation in Mexico today exactly duplicates that in
Colombia a decade ago. In 1999 Colombia was afflicted
by a relatively unified insurgency; in 2009 the Mexican
cartels are a far more disparate—and often fratricidal—
bunch. Plan Colombia involved hundreds of U.S. troops
and private contractors that were intimately involved
in Colombian military operations; Mexican officials
have made clear that no U.S. military personnel will be
allowed to operate in Mexico.
If the differences are important, however, the areas
of convergence are perhaps more significant. The basic
conceptual outlines are the same, as is the emphasis
on interdiction and capacity-building. Moreover, the
comments of U.S. officials reveal an expectation that the
Merida Initiative is, in fact, the follow-on to previous
U.S. programs in Colombia. “Just as the Medellin and
Cali cartels were destroyed when law enforcement
was provided with the equipment and intelligence
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it needed to attack them,” reports Scott Burns,
ONDCP official, in testimony before a U.S. House of
Representatives Subcommittee, “the Merida Initiative
provides tools to dismantle today’s leading cartels and
leave them with little space to regroup.”125 The Mexican
government seems to be on the same wavelength, as
groups of officials have recently visited Colombia for
consultations on counternarcotics policy.126
There are scant indications, however, that the Merida Initiative will provide a better-rounded approach
to counternarcotics than its antecedent. With respect to
security and interdiction issues, to be sure, it does seem
likely that the initiative will produce beneficial results.
The delivery of helicopters will enhance the mobility of
the government forces, augmenting their ability to react
quickly, while the provision of surveillance aircraft and
intelligence support will give the authorities greater
informational awareness and allow them to deploy
troops and police more intelligently. In light of the
current “whack-a-mole” dynamic in Mexico, the value
of these contributions is not to be underestimated.
U.S. equipment and training can be similarly useful
in addressing some of the operational weaknesses
that have hampered the performance of Mexican law
enforcement. Advanced inspection equipment will
force the cartels to adopt new smuggling tactics and
routines. Secure communications capabilities can
help Mexican police agencies overcome persistent
coordination gaps, facilitate intelligence sharing, and
allow them to mount a more cooperative effort.127
The Merida Initiative is also conducive to the
expansion and institutionalization of existing bilateral
projects. Since 2006, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) officials have conducted training
programs designed to aid their Mexican counterparts
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in impeding cash smuggling and other illicit financial
flows.128 Federal police units trained under Garcia Luna
(who has a reputation for honesty and professionalism)
have performed well when aided by intelligence
gathered by the interagency Border Enforcement and
Security Task Force (BEST) and other U.S. offices.129
The Merida Initiative provides greater funding and a
more regularized approach to such exchanges, and thus
constitutes a way of locking in their positive effects.
Yet, as the history of Plan Colombia shows, a fully
effective approach to counternarcotics will require
going far beyond interdiction and security issues, and
in this regard the outlook for the Merida Initiative is
not particularly promising. Like Plan Colombia, the
Merida Initiative focuses primarily on the most visible
manifestations of the drug trade, rather than grappling
seriously with the deeper, more difficult issues that
drive that business.
This is certainly the case with respect to problems
like corruption, human rights abuses, and the culture
of impunity that have consistently undermined
Calderon’s counternarcotics program. The Merida
Initiative is not silent on these issues (it contains a
small amount of aid for judicial reform, several million
dollars for police vetting purposes, and restrictions to
ensure that U.S. officials do not interact with military
units implicated in human rights violations), and
Mexico is included in stand-alone U.S. human rights
and anti-corruption programs. Still, the current
American commitment to anti-corruption and the rule
of law in Mexico is insufficient. Resources devoted
to these issues pale in comparison to those spent on
helicopters and inspection equipment, despite the
fact that these tools will prove useful only if Mexico’s
institutions of internal order actually function in an
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honest, professional manner. The Merida Initiative has
only $1 million per year slated to aid in the reform of
Mexico’s courts—roughly one-quarter of 1 percent of
first-year funding. Vetting programs receive similarly
minor emphasis, and there are a number of issues
central to any meaningful anti-corruption initiative—
efforts to lessen the opacity of the banking system, for
instance—that are not addressed at all. In short, while
anti-corruption and human rights issues are not absent
from U.S. policy toward Mexico under the Merida
Initiative, they are not accorded the salience necessary,
given the gravity and scope of these problems.130
The Merida Initiative is little better equipped to
confront the other factors that have so far impeded
progress in Mexico’s drug war. As currently designed,
the plan contains no social programs aimed at
preventing youths from gravitating toward the cartels,
nor does it feature economic development or povertyalleviation initiatives. The U.S. experience in Colombia
since 2000 demonstrates that a failure to present poor
workers with legitimate work alternatives to criminal
activity can have a debilitating impact on even the
most aggressive counterdrug programs. On this score,
the Merida Initiative leaves much to be desired.
Nor will the Merida program likely do much to
deflect or impede the iron river of guns that supports
drug-related violence in Mexico. The Merida Initiative
overlaps somewhat a preexisting program known as
Operation GUNRUNNER, which has received a recent
funding increase. GUNRUNNER is meant to combat
the illicit arms flow by tracing guns used in Mexico
back to their origin in the United States. As this project
has unfolded, however, it has been overwhelmed by
the sheer volume of weapons heading south. While the
ATF seized nearly 1,300 guns headed for Mexico last
year, that number represents only a minuscule fraction
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of the weapons that crossed the border each month.131
Speaking anonymously, U.S. officials have conceded
that, given the comparative laxity of U.S. gun laws,
the difficulty of tracing weapons acquired through
pawn shops or gun shows, and the porous nature of
America’s southern frontier, seeking to staunch the
flow of guns with a few dozen extra ATF agents is a
quixotic quest.132 “If you can’t deal with the issue of
guns,” one U.S. congressional aide involved in the
drafting of the Merida Initiative admits, “you’re not
going to see much progress.”133
The Merida Initiative is thus not being partnered
with any real efforts to ramp up prevention, treatment,
or other demand-side programs in the United States.
Rather, the money spent on the Merida Initiative
seems to have come at the expense of such programs.
The budget for anti-drug-use advertising in the
United States fell by more than half (from $140 million
annually to $60 million) under the Bush administration,
and the approval of the Merida Initiative occurred
concurrent with a $73 million cut in domestic treatment
programs.134
This is a short-sighted strategy. The GAO has recently released a study concluding that the U.S.-Mexican border is so porous that constricting cross-border drug flows is virtually impossible as long as a lucrative market for these products exists. “Given the temptation,” says Garcia Luna, “there are people who are always going to play the game, whether by airplane or
helicopter, by land, by sea, because there is a real market.”135 The Merida Initiative thus violates the inescapable mandate required of effective counternarcotics
strategy: that while supply-side programs are politically popular and produce attractive statistics, unless
they are paired with demand-side initiatives, they tend
to produce few long-lasting gains.
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In congressional hearings on the Merida Initiative
prior to its passage, Representative Eliot Engel (D-NY),
head of the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
offered a pessimistic appraisal of the program:
As long as there is demand for illegal narcotics in the
United States, suppliers will sell their cocaine and
heroin and other drugs on our streets, and as long as the
narcotraffickers are armed with guns from the United
States the brutal violence of the drug gangs will continue
unabated. . . . This is my concern with the Merida
Initiative. . . . We will spend more than $1 billion on
security assistance for Mexico and Central America over
the next 2 years, but it is not clear that we are stepping
up our efforts so we can cement the gains the Merida
Initiative is designed to achieve abroad.136

In view of the evidence adduced earlier, it is hard
to quarrel with this assessment. The Mexican drug
trade thrives on deeply embedded pathologies such
as U.S. demand, cross-border gunrunning, poverty
and corruption in Mexico, and the institutional
deficiencies of the Mexican state. So far, a combination
of these problems has frustrated President Calderon’s
offensive, ensuring that record numbers of arrests and
seizures have resulted in little lasting reduction in
either internal violence or drug exports. At present, it
is unrealistic to expect that the Merida Initiative will
contribute substantially to resolving these ills. It thus
seems improbable that the initiative will be more than
of temporary benefit in reducing the drug trade and
drug-related violence in Mexico.
THE WAY FORWARD
A thoroughgoing revision of U.S. counterdrug policy is therefore needed. U.S. officials must craft a more
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comprehensive and coherent strategy than currently
exists, one that addresses not just the symptoms of the
disease, but its causes as well. Admiral James Stavridis,
head of U.S. Southern Command, has recently
commented that the United States and its partners
must adopt a “more holistic, integrated approach” to
security threats in the Western Hemisphere. Those
charged with making U.S. counternarcotics policy
would do well to heed his advice.137
Such an approach should consist of five essential
elements: (1) traditional counternarcotics operations
such as security and interdiction; (2) anti-corruption
and human rights; (3) government institutional
development; (4) economic and social development;
and (5) measures to reduce America’s homegrown
contributions to the drug trade. Unlike the current
paradigm, under which several of these themes are included but relegated to a distinctly secondary position,
each of these five elements must be an integral part
of counterdrug policy and receive adequate funding
and official attention. A useful analogy in this regard
would be a successful counterinsurgency in which
the use of force must be integrated seamlessly into a
larger scheme of political, military, social, diplomatic,
and economic programs, all of which reinforce—rather
than competing with or undermining—one another.
Security and Interdiction.
For all the liabilities of security- and interdictionfocused efforts, they remain vital components of any
comprehensive counterdrug program. Economic
development and political reform cannot occur in
a context of violent anarchy, any more than internal
order can be sustained if these deeper problems remain
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unresolved. Similarly, while interdiction has often
been treated as a panacea, if practiced successfully it
can keep the cartels off-balance by disrupting their
operations and raising the costs of doing business.
The assistance currently accorded priority under the
Merida Initiative (aid in developing rapid deployment,
surveillance, and detection capabilities, and training in
counternarcotics operations) constitutes a good start
in this regard, and should be complemented with
additional initiatives in the coming years. The United
States can provide nonlethal aid like body armor to
the Mexican police, establish institutional frameworks
for intelligence-sharing and cross-border interagency
cooperation on issues like money laundering, and
assist the Mexican police and military in conducting psychological and information operations. The
brutality of groups like the Zetas—and their skill in
publicizing these exploits—currently permits the
cartels to dominate the information environment. The
Mexican government must confront this issue if it
hopes to redress the current sense of public insecurity.
Since 2000, U.S. advisers in Colombia have helped
that country’s military and law enforcement agencies
implement psychological operations to defeat guerrilla
propaganda and weaken insurgent morale; similar
efforts would seem to be in order under the Merida
Initiative.138
Anti-Corruption and Human Rights.
Of course, any benefits reaped from such assistance
will be ephemeral at best if the forces of order in Mexico
continue to be penetrated by cartel informants and
perceived by the public as “brutal corrupt thugs.”139
The current U.S. prohibition on training foreign
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military units implicated in human rights violations
and the allocation of several million dollars for vetting
purposes represent a basic recognition of this issue, but
in going forward Washington must place much greater
stress on this problem than is presently the case.
Beyond augmenting the resources devoted to
Calderon’s anti-corruption campaign, the United States
can take several other steps. As they have already
begun to do in Central America, U.S. agencies should
offer regular personnel exchanges meant to promote
a culture of professionalism within Mexican law
enforcement and greater awareness of human rights
issues within the military. Similarly, the United States
should pay particular attention to helping Calderon
create the small, specially vetted units that he intends
to use for sensitive missions, and insist that any police
units receiving access to U.S. intelligence or funding
undergo rigorous, comprehensive screening. Finally,
while Mexican political and historical sensitivities
preclude direct military-to-military human rights
training within that country, the United States can
strengthen the human rights framework in Mexico
by offering financial and technical assistance to the
agencies charged with investigating and prosecuting
suspected abuses. Though it would be wildly
unrealistic to expect that these measures will end the
problems of corruption and immunity to punishment
in Mexico, they can, if sustained, begin to ameliorate
these difficulties and create a core of professionalized
security officials.
Institutional Development.
Efforts to help strengthen weak judicial institutions
so far make up a very small part of the Merida Initiative,
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but improving and expanding U.S. engagement on
these issues is critical. The United States should offer to
assist Mexico in developing specific anti-gang and anticartel laws, and the various U.S. agencies with special
expertise in fighting organized crime can provide aid in
fashioning effective prosecution strategies. The United
States already has professional exchanges that focus on
these issues in place vis-à-vis several Central American
nations; if extended to Mexico, such programs can offer
a relatively inexpensive way of making that country’s
legal system better suited to tackling current threats.
Even more important will be greater support for
President Calderon’s new initiative to modernize
judicial procedures by permitting the use of oral evidence, conducting open rather than secret proceedings, and improving the transparency and efficiency of
the Mexican court system. Central American countries
working with the financial and technical assistance
of USAID have had some success in conducting such
reforms and making their legal systems more accessible
to the population. Similar cooperation will be essential
in Mexico.140
Economic and Social Development.
Over the long term, the success of counternarcotics in Mexico will hinge in no small part on the government’s ability to address the economic grievances and
social alienation that often inform criminal activity.
The security threats that the United States confronts
in the Western Hemisphere, Admiral Stavridis has
recently written, “are symptoms of the deeper endemic
problems of poverty and inequality.”141
Setting aside the herculean economic and financial
problems now facing Mexico—and indeed all the
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world’s nations—as a result of the current global economic meltdown, efforts to relieve the endemic strains
should focus on the micro level rather than the macro.
The need will be for small-scale, precisely targeted
projects that alleviate the endemic poverty that has long
afflicted much of the country and provide economic and
social alternatives to criminal activity for populations
at risk. Micro-finance and vocational training programs
provide good examples of such initiatives, which
have already been used for counternarcotics and antiorganized crime purposes in Central America. A pilot
program in El Salvador recently reintegrated roughly
300 former gang members into society by offering
training in carpentry, screen-printing, and other such
activities, and the Inter-American Development Bank
has approved a $32 million loan to Honduras for a
micro-entrepreneurship program aimed at vulnerable
youths.142 These programs should be replicated on
a broader scale in Mexico, along with sustained and
sufficiently funded alternative development projects
that will provide economic incentives for marijuana
farmers to switch to legal crops.
Guns and Users: U.S. Domestic Contributions.
Due to the political controversy that surrounds
issues like gun laws and U.S. domestic demand,
these questions may well prove to be the thorniest
aspects of counternarcotics policy. With respect to
demand, the debate on this issue is often framed as
a choice between legalization and enforcement. In
reality, this is false dichotomy. Studies by the RAND
Corporation have shown that, if funded properly,
prevention and treatment initiatives—running the
gamut from anti-drug-use advertising to education to
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addict rehabilitation—can have a significant impact in
countering domestic drug use and thereby lowering
demand. These studies conclude, in fact, that in a
dollar-for-dollar sense, prevention and treatment are
far more efficient and economical than enforcement
and interdiction. One dollar spent on the former
category, RAND calculates, carries the same effect
as 7.3 dollars spent on the latter.143 Accordingly, the
Merida Initiative must be married to an expansion—
rather than the present contraction—of a wide range of
treatment and prevention programs. Doing so would
hardly solve the problem of domestic drug use, but it
could have a strong positive impact on the problem
and bring Washington’s internal efforts in line with its
energetic counternarcotics programs abroad.
Regarding guns, one relatively uncontroversial
solution would be a dramatic expansion of funding
for ATF programs designed to trace weapons used
in Mexico to their sources in the United States and
impede them from being smuggled across the border.
Such an undertaking would certainly have a positive
effect on the current discouraging situation, but the
beneficial impact would likely not be sufficient. The
U.S.-Mexican border is simply too porous to prevent
determined smugglers from carrying their goods
across the frontier, and U.S. gun laws currently
impede the ATF and other federal agencies from being
aggressively proactive in their efforts to restrict sales
to potential smugglers.144 “There are very, very strict
limits set on what [the ATF is] allowed to do,” says one
expert.145 In short, dealing successfully with the “iron
river” may require far more controversial changes in
U.S. gun laws, such as renewing the assault weapons
ban, establishing a national registry of arms sales, and
other restrictive measures. Admittedly, whether such
proposals are politically feasible remains to be seen.
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CONCLUSION
As the apparent intractability of the gun issue
demonstrates, crafting a comprehensive counternarcotics strategy will be no easy undertaking. Doing
so will require going past the politically popular aspects
of counternarcotics, such as interdiction, and zeroing
in on more contested issues like guns and demand. In
financial terms, funding at the necessary levels all of the
programs discussed above will involve expenditures
considerably beyond those already approved for Plan
Merida. Moreover, creating such a program will entail a
determined effort by the White House Office of National
Drug Control Policy to ensure that counternarcotics
receives sustained executive-level attention and that
the myriad agencies involved—ranging from the ATF
to USAID—achieve the coordination necessary to
preclude one aspect of this strategy from countering
the efforts of the others. Finally, it bears repeating that
the inter-hemispheric drug trade is so entrenched that
even a “perfect” counternarcotics strategy will produce
meaningful progress only over the long term.
The costs of action are therefore high, but the price
of inaction would be exponentially greater. The effects
of drug use in the United States and the potential for the
economic and political destabilization of Mexico make
counternarcotics an immensely significant national
security issue. Addressing this problem effectively will
require substantial economic resources and political
capital, but, given the stakes, the investment is a
necessary one. American policymakers must seize on
the current crisis to achieve a balanced counternarcotics
policy, one that not only strengthens Mexico’s forces
of order but also addresses the underlying issues that
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have long nourished the drug trade and made it so
violent. If they do so, the United States may finally
begin to make sustainable progress in curbing narcotics
smuggling and its devastating effects. It they do not,
the Merida Initiative will simply go down as one more
failed offensive in the long campaign against drugs.
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